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TIME LIMITS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT:
ANOTHER PROBLEMATIC NEW PROPERTY REFORM
KAREN CZAPANSKIY*
Professor Simon argues that the New Property jurisprudes may
have taken something of a wrong path in their efforts to reform the
welfare system.' While praising their substantive goal of establish-
ing welfare as an entitlement, he criticizes their limited jurispruden-
tial foresight and hindsight as well as their practical results. He
suggests, further, that social work jurisprudence, while not immune
from criticism, contains valuable insights for a rethinking of the
modern law of public benefits.
The New Property theories Professor Simon examines in the
welfare area animated other legal reform efforts during the 1960s
and 1970s. One example is the effort to increase public access to
government information, which produced legislation twice during
the height of the New Property jurisprudence movement: in 1966,
when the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was enacted, and in
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charged with developing and implementing government-wide and Justice Department
policies under the Freedom of Information Act.
The author's special thanks go to Patricia Hamill for her work as research assistant
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Without her, this Comment would not have been written.
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1. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as Simon, Welfare Rights]; see also Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class
in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Simon, Welfare System].
Professor Simon's focus in Welfare Rights is on the ideas articulated in Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), but he also discusses the ideas of those who followed
Reich, see generally sources cited infra note 13. In the Yale article, Professor Simon ex-
plains at greater length several of the themes of Welfare Rights that are central to this
Comment. My discussion, therefore, draws on both pieces.
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1974 when it was amended.2 If Professor Simon is correct that New
Property-style welfare reforms were imperfect, other reforms, such
as the FOIA, may be flawed as well. To use a metaphor from the
natural sciences, I ask in this Comment whether Professor Simon's
critique can be reproduced in another laboratory. I conclude that
his critique may be applied to an important FOIA reform: the time
limits within which government agencies are required to respond to
information requests. And I conclude that his determination that
social work jurisprudence provides a better reform model than does
the New Property jurisprudence is validated in some respects by the
FOIA experience.
I. NEW PROPERTY AND SOCIAL WORK JURISPRUDENCE
According to Professor Simon, the New Property jurisprudence
notion of welfare entitlement is derived to a significant degree from
classical jurisprudence.' The classical jurisprudes4 believed that
certain property rights constituted a zone of immunity protected
both from governmental interference and from intrusion by others.5
Similarly, the New Property jurisprudes defined public benefits as
constituting a zone of immunity.6 The goal of New Property juris-
prudes in establishing the zone of immunity was to reduce oppres-
sive and punitive moralism, invasion of privacy, and personal favor. 7
Professor Simon criticizes the New Property entitlements the-
ory as being no more than an extension of classical notions of right.
Further, he asserts that the New Property jurisprudes failed to rec-
oncile New Property rights with an appropriate principle for the dis-
tribution of those rights.' The classical principle of distribution was
based on effort and exchange; welfare benefits are the product of
neither. The distributive premise of welfare is need, a notion that
the classical legalists could not reconcile with the notion of right.9
2. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966). The Act
was subsequently amended. Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561-64 (1974) (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)) (adding measures to compel agency
compliance).
3. Simon, Welfare Rights, supra note 1, at 22.
4. The classical jurisprudes included John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, John Jus-
tin, Frederick Pollack, Sheldon Amos, Christopher Columbus Langdell and John Chip-
man Gray. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in AnalyticalJurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld,
1982 Wis. L. REv. 975, cited in id., at 8 & 9 n.31.
5. Simon, Welfare Rights, supra note 1, at 9, 22.
6. Id. at 22.
7. Simon, Welfare System, supra note 1, at 1220-21.
8. Simon, Welfare Rights, supra note 1, at 22-24.
9. Id. at 10.
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Professor Simon argues that the New Property jurisprudence merely
recategorizes classical rights and fails to recognize that those rights
must be grounded in a new distributive principle, that of need.'" In
contrast, social work jursprudence both recognized welfare as a
right and argued that the distributive premise of this public benefit
was need, not the classical premise of effort and exchange."
Professor Simon's criticism of the New Property jurisprudes is
not limited to an attack on their concept of property rights as zones
of immunity and a condemnation of their failure to recognize that
public benefit rights must rest on a different distributive principle.
He also argues that certain New Property principles of public ad-
ministration have to be questioned in light of the experience of two
decades.' 2 Three procedural goals of the New Property jurisprudes
are the most problematical: the formalization or standardization of
entitlement, the bureaucratization of administration, and the
proletarianization of the lower tier of the workforce.' 3 In Professor
Simon's analysis, formalization means the definition of eligibility
norms as rules,1 4 bureaucratization means establishment of a for-
mally hierarchical organization, and proletarianization means as-
10. Id. at 24-25.
11. Id. at 13-15.
12. Id. at 32-35.
13. Id. at 26 (citing Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 479 (1960); Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 772, (1974)). For a critical study of these goals, see generally Simon, Welfare System,
supra note 1.
These New Property procedural goals were derived from the ideas of sociologist
Max Weber. Id. at 1224 n.75, 1224-40. Weber stated that citizens' interaction with gov-
ernment must be routinized; government responses to citizens' requests must be standard-
ized; and the government work force must be proletarianized so that standards will be
followed consistently. Id. at 1199, 1223-26. Furthermore, Professor Simon states that
the procedural goals articulated by those who followed Reich were derived from the
Reichian notion of freedom from state power, and that freedom in general was
grounded in the control of state power. Simon, Welfare Rights, supra note 1, at 26. Pro-
fessor Simon explores these concepts in the context of welfare distribution, using the
terms "formality," "bureaucratization," and "proletarianization" that those who fol-
lowed Reich developed.
Formality was supposed to limit state power by limiting the number of factors
the state could consider in decisionmaking; bureaucratization was supposed to
do so by subjecting initial decisionmakers to the control of higher level deci-
sionmakers; and proletarianization was supposed to do so by recruiting and
socializing people who would divorce their personal goals from their work.
Id. at 28.
14. A rule is more precise and explicit than a standard because a rule decreases the
number of factors that can be considered by the decisionmaker. As a result, a rule, with
respect to its purpose, is overinclusive and underinclusive. In contrast to a rule's
mechanical application, a standard encompasses the element of discretion. In imple-
menting the standard, the decisionmaker will be guided by the purpose of the standard;
[VOL. 44:38
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signing work to line-level workers who have little status, skill, and
education.' 5 The New Property thinkers adopted these procedural
goals, according to Professor Simon, as a logical result of their re-
jection of bureaucratic discretion as a central tenet of public admin-
istration. 6 Prior to the New Property reforms, bureaucrats in the
welfare system operating according to the tenets of social work ju-
risprudence were to exercise their discretion in interpreting the
standards and in applying them to individual cases based on the
purpose of the standard. As a result of New Property reforms, bu-
reaucrats were to make fewer and simpler substantive judgments, to
consistently apply formal standards and to give less consideration to
individual claims. '
7
The social work thinkers of the Progressive Era had an entirely
different model of public administration. Because they considered
their client's entitlement to public benefits as part of a continuing
dialectical process, they emphasized individualized treatment of
each client, professionalization of those who administered the bene-
fits, the social workers, and substantial discretion entrusted to work-
ers at the lowest levels.' 8
The fundamental difference between the New Property and the
social work jurisprudes thus was not in their view of the substantive
entitlement of poor people to public benefits. It was instead in their
a standard allows a decisionmaker to exercise her discretion and make individual assess-
ments. Simon, Welfare System, supra note 1, at 1202.
15. Id. at 1199.
16. Simon, Welfare Rights, supra note 1, at 26.
17. Simon, Welfare System, supra note 1, at 1204, 1225. According to Professor Si-
mon, formalization may be antithetical to fairness because the unique needs of individu-
als may be ignored. For example, the mechanical application of rules by the government
may result in extreme disparity of resources allocated to two beneficiaries who are alike
only in that they fit the formalized category (e.g., both are poor). Their needs, which are
based on their unique situations, may be quite different. Cf. Capowski, Accuracy and Con-
sistency in Categorical Decisionmaking: A Study of Social Security's Medical-Vocational Guidelines-
Two Birds With One Stone or Pigeon-holing Claimants?, 42 MD. L. REV. 329, 349 (1983) ("The
Medical-Vocational Guidelines . . . have been criticized and challenged as replacing in-
dividualized decision-making with an 'average man' concept."). In addition, a formal-
ized system is subject to manipulation by the supervising political or judicial hierarchy.
Simon, Welfare Rights, supra note 1, at 32. As Simon notes, when those in control of that
hierarchy disfavor public benefits, this New Property procedural reform can be used to
attack a New Property right. Id. at 34.
A proletarianized workforce is supposed to churn out public benefits decisions
rapidly and impartially. But, as Simon notes, a particular public benefit applicant may
be disadvantaged for lack of information or interest. Further, under a bureaucratic sys-
tem the line-level worker will be particularly responsive to changes in standards imposed
by the politically controlled hierarchy because the worker is less involved with the client
being served.
18. Simon, Welfare Rights, supra note 1, at 14-21.
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view of how to implement the right. The social work jurisprudes
agreed with the New Property jurisprudes that the welfare recipient
should not be subject to manipulation and arbitrariness, 9 but dis-
agreed that bureaucratic formalism was the method by which to ac-
complish this goal.2 0 The New Property jurisprudes rejected
bureaucratic discretion in favor of formalized rules. They entrusted
policy determinations and supervision to high-level administrators
and the judiciary. 2' In contrast, the social workers sought to decen-
tralize bureaucratic authority and enlarge the scope of discretion ex-
ercised by line-level workers, and they considered a dialectical
exchange between line-level workers and their clients to be crucial
to implementing the right. They stressed education and profession-
alization, so that the workers would properly perform their role. A
major role of the higher officials was to enhance the professionalism
of workers through educational supervision. Virtually no role was
envisioned for the judiciary.22
Professor Simon considers the social work heritage to be supe-
rior in some respects to the New Property notions that supplanted
it. To evaluate the accuracy of that conclusion, I will use his ideas to
examine the portion of the statutory scheme governing access to
government information that sets the time limits for administrative
action. I think my discussion will show that social work jurispru-
dence may provide a promising alternative for solving certain
problems created by the New Property heritage of the Freedom of
Information Act.
II. FOIA: AcCESS TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
The general right of public access to government information is
codified in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which was en-
acted in 1966, and amended in major ways in 1974.23 Its purpose is
to foster the education of the general public about the govern-
ment.2 4 In New Property terms, the Act entitles all members of the
19. Id. at 18-19. Both the New Property and the social workjurisprudes agreed that
condescending moralism, invasion of privacy and personal favor should be excised from
distribution of welfare entitlements. See supra, text accompanying note 7.
20. Id. at 19-20.
21. Id. at 28.
22. Id. at 18-20.
23. See supra note 2.
24.
Recognition of the people's right to learn what their government is do-
ing through access to government information can be traced back to the early
days of our Nation. Open government has been recognized as the best insur-
[VOL. 44:38
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general public to inspect any information in government files that is
not specifically exempt from inspection.
In contrast, the prior public information statute, section 3 of
the Administrative Procedure Act,25 provided that a limited segment
of the general public could inspect government information if the
agency saw fit to permit inspection. Only those members of the
public who were "properly and directly concerned" could request
information;26 the request could be denied whenever "good cause"
was found.2 7 Agency discretion was not reviewable.
The FOIA was adopted in response to typical 1960s and 1970s
criticisms of government conduct. The "good cause" language of
section 3 established no explicit or precise rules for what informa-
tion was to be released and what could be withheld.2" Under the
"properly and directly concerned" language, the section allowed
distinctions to be drawn among requesters and requests to be de-
nied based on the identity of the requester.2 9 Critics cited the sec-
tion's lack of rules as the reason for bureaucratic decisions to
withhold information about controversial or embarassing agency ac-
tions.3" The section did not require high-level appointees and the
ance that government is being conducted in the public interest, and the First
Amendment reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers that the pub-
lic's right to information is basic to the maintenance of a popular form of gov-
ernment. Since the First Amendment protects not only the right of citizens to
speak and publish, but also to receive information, freedom of information leg-
islation can be seen as an affirmative congressional effort to give meaningful
content to constitutional freedom of expression. Moreover, to exercise effec-
tively their First Amendment rights, the people must know what their govern-
ment is doing.
S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1974).
25. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3(c), 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946) (current
version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)).
26. The Administative Procedure Act provided: "Save as otherwise required by stat-
ute, matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule be made available
to persons properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for
good cause found." Id.
27. Id. § 3(a), (b).
28. Examples of the wide range of interpretations given by agencies to their public
information obligations can be found in the public information regulations promulgated
during the late 1940s. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1948) (Tennessee Valley Authority)
(engineering drawings, plans and designs available to "persons conducting or planning
to conduct operations involving [their] use"); 32 C.F.R. § 8402.7 (1947) (War Assets
Administration) (no release of information "which appears to be of a confidential na-
ture"); 42 C.F.R. § 1.112 (1947) (Public Health Service) (information disclosable if dis-
closure "would be in the public interest"); 43 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.5 (1948) (Public Lands:
Interior) (information to be released unless disclosure "would be prejudicial to the in-
terests of the government").
29. See supra note 28.
30. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5-10, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
courts to supervise the work of line-level workers. Critics argued
that lineworkers used their freedom to act arbitrarily; their solution
was bureaucratization in the form of accountability and judicial re-
view.31 Finally, the section's grants of wide discretion to withhold
information meant that decisions to release information often re-
quired the approval of high-level officials,3 2 a slow and cumbersome
process. The solution offered by New Property-style critics was a
proletarianized system with clear rules that clerical personnel would
follow under the supervision of the courts.
The Freedom of Information Act that emerged from the criti-
cism was typically New Property on the procedural questions and
strongly influenced by New Property jurisprudence on the substan-
tive questions. Public entitlement to some types of information is
absolute; to other types of information, the entitlement is bounded
by clear and straightforward criteria. For example, the public has an
absolute right to view statements of agency policy and interpreta-
tion.3 3 The apparent goal of the legislative scheme was to create a
type of "zone of immunity" around the public's right to these
materials.3 4 The limits to the zone are exemptions allowing agen-
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418; 112 CONG. REC. H13,642-43 (1966) (statement of Rep.
Moss, Chairman, Special Government Information Subcomm.); id. at H 13,643-45 (state-
ment of Rep. King); id. at H 13,646-47 (statement of Rep. Reid); id. at H 13,647-48 (state-
ment of Rep. Laird); id. at H13,649 (statement of Rep. Fascell); id. at H13,656
(statement of Rep. Rosenthal); id. at H 13,658 (statement of Rep. Rogers); id. at H 13,659
(statement of Rep. Gallagher); H. CROSs, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 199, 208, 219
(1953).
31. See supra note 30; see generally Giannella, Agency Procedures Implementing the Freedom of
Information Act: A Proposal for Uniform Regulations, 23 AD. L. REV. 217, 224 (1971).
32. See supra notes 28, 30; Giannella, supra note 31, at 223, 238-39.
33. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)(B) (1982) (agency shall publish "statements of the
general course and method by which its functions are channeled and determined"); 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (1982) (agencies shall make available for public inspection "final
opinions . . . made in the adjudication of cases"); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B) (1982)
("those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency
and are not published in the Federal Register"); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) (1982) (agen-
cies shall make available for public inspection "administrative staff manuals and instruc-
tions to staff that affect a member of the public").
34. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418 (purpose of bill is "to provide a true Federal public records
statute by requiring the availability, to any member of the public, of all of the executive
branch records described in its requirements, except those involving matters which are
within nine stated exemptions"). "Subsection (b) of the Act creates nine exemptions
from compelled disclosures. These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(c), and are plainly intended to set up concrete, workable standards for determin-
ing whether particular material may be withheld or must be disclosed." EPA v. Mink,
410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
The exclusive exemptions from disclosure apply to matters that are:
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order
[VOL. 44:38
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cies to withhold, for example, predecisional memoranda 35 and ma-
terial related solely to "internal personnel rules and practices."
36
Public entitlement to other types of information is subject to more
fluid standards or to balancing tests. When the government's files
include private information, for example, public entitlement is lim-
ited to information whose release would not constitute a "clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." '3 7 The statutory plan is
particularly fluid in its treatment of national security materials.
Properly classified information is withholdable.38 Classification is a
flexible concept, however; the executive branch, by executive order,
defines what is classifiable39 and can change the criteria for classifi-
cation without congressional approval.40 In exercising this power,
to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign policy and (B)
are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . provided that such
statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a man-
ner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria
for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforce-
ment proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D)
disclose the identity of a confidential source . . . , (E) disclose investigative
techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
. . of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial in-
stitutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, con-
cerning wells.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
35. Compare NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) (Advice and Ap-
peals Memoranda directing the filing of a complaint are exempt) with EPA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73 (1973) (not all portions of predecisional memoranda may be withheld; test is
whether material reflects deliberative process or factual investigative matters).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1982). See, e.g., Rose v. USAF, 425 U.S. 352, 362-70 (1976)
(discussion on scope of the exemption for internal personnel rules and practices).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982). See, e.g., United States Dep't of State v. Washington
Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982); Rose v. USAF, 425 U.S. 352, 370-82 (1976); 1 K.C. DA-
vis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 322-23 (2d ed. 1978).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1982).
39. Id. § 552(b)(l)(A).
40. See Halperin, Security Classification and the Secrecy System, 1 GOV'T INFORMATION Q.
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recent presidents have qualified different types and quantities of
material for classification and, therefore, for exemption from public
release under the FOIA.4"
New Property theories of public administration that became
dominant in the welfare programs during the 1960s and 1970s also
are evident in the FOIA. Like the procedures for awarding welfare
benefits, FOIA procedures are characterized by bureaucratization,
formalization, and proletarianization. As a result, low-level bureau-
cratic discretion has been circumscribed.4 2 The opportunities for
bureaucrats to distinguish among members of the public are few;4 3
judgment calls are rare while specific standardized answers are
many;4 4 and the judiciary is entrusted with the task of ensuring com-
pliance with the statute.45
117, 123 (1984); see also Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEX. L. REV. 785,
869-72 (1984).
41. Compare the Carter Administration's Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190
(1979), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 401 (West Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Carter Exec. Order] ("If there is a reason-
able doubt which designation is appropriate, or whether the information should be clas-
sified at all, the less restrictive designation should be used, or the information should
not be classified."), with the Reagan Administration's Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R.
166 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Reagan Exec. Order] ("If there is reasonable doubt
about the need to classify information, it shall be safeguarded as if it were classified
pending a determination by an original classification authority. . . . If there is reason-
able doubt about the appropriate level of classification, it shall be safeguarded at the
higher level of classification pending a determination by an original classification author-
ity .... "). Compare Carter Exec. Order, § 1-104 (" 'Confidential' shall be applied to
information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to
cause identifiable damage to the national security.") (emphasis added), with Reagan Exec.
Order, § l.l(a)(3) (" 'Confidential' shall be applied to information, the unauthorized
disclosure of which, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to national secur-
ity."). Compare Carter Exec. Order, § 1-401 (For secret and confidential classifications
"at the time of the original classification each original classification authority shall set a
date or event for automatic declassification no more than six years later."), with Reagan
Exec. Order, § 1.4(a) ("Information shall be classified as long as required by national
security considerations.").
42. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982) (describing records specifically exempted from
the FOIA's public access provisions), with Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3(c),
60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946) (discretion remained with agency to determine whether re-
quested information should be "held confidential for good cause found").
43. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982) ("any person" may make request), with 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1982) (waiver or reduction of copying and search fees available
when release primarily benefits the general public); see 1 K.C. DAVIS, supra note 37, at 43-
47 (Supp. 1982) (criticizing decisions suggesting that "any person" includes only those
requests benefitting the general public).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2), (a)(6)(A)-(B) (1982).
45. Agency decisions are reviewed de novo by the district court, which has the au-
thority to examine the disputed records in camera. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982). Fur-
ther, if a court finds that an agency has acted arbitrarily in withholding records, the Civil
[VOL. 44:38
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The implementation of the FOIA by government agencies re-
flects New Property norms described by Professor Simon. For ex-
ample, he notes that granting lawyers the authority to make policy
and control bureaucratic behavior is a typical action of the New
Propertyjurisprudes.46 In FOIA administration, initial responses to
requests usually are made by non-lawyer personnel such as public
information office staff, program analysts, or professionals within
the agency.47 If a requester, dissatisfied with the initial response,
files an appeal, however, the review authority typically is exercised
by an agency attorney. Further, general FOIA policy is developed
by lawyers in the Department of Justice's Office of Information and
Privacy.48 In addition to setting broad policy on access questions,
the Office is responsible for advising other agencies on whether ex-
emption claims and administrative procedures are appropriate and
will be defended in court, and for training personnel of other agen-
cies about the FOIA.49
A typical FOIA example of New Property theories of public ad-
ministration is found in the time limit provisions adopted in 1974 in
response to the problems of slow agency response times to FOIA
requests. As first enacted in 1966, the FOIA required that records
be made "promptly available."' 50 Thus, agencies were not required
to respond to requests within specific time periods. Problems were
noted almost immediately. 5 In response, the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States recommended in 1971 that agencies
change their practices by responding to requests within ten days,
absent special circumstances; 52 but complaints about slower re-
Service Commission will begin a proceeding to see if disciplinary action should be taken
against the agency officer or employee. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F) (1982).
46. -[T]he administrative reforms prescribed and rationalized by the New Property
had the effect of eliminating the influence over public assistance of a profession domi-
nated by women (social work), in favor of professions dominated by men (law and man-
agement)." Simon, Welfare Rights, supra note 1, at 36.
47. For example, the FBI uses special agents to supervise or do initial processing of
the more difficult requests. Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547
F.2d 605, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1974)
("most of the personnel, units, and facilities involved in administering the Act are the
same as those involved in performing other agency functions").
48. 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.23(c), 0.23a (1983).
49. Id.
50. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)).
51. See K.C. DAVIs, supra note 37, at 309-10.
52. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1970-71 Report, § (B)(4),
at 53-54 (1971) (Recommendation No. 24) (special circumstances warranting delays in-
clude cases in which the requested records are stored at other locations or have not been
located in the course of a routine search and additional efforts are being made to locate
1985]
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sponse times remained common. The source of the complaints
often was the news media: Unless information was provided
quickly, it became yesterday's news, useless to a media requester.54
The delayed processing of requests effectively denied the press its
entitlement to information under the FOIA.
By 1974, Congress recognized that the delays were a significant
reason for the relative lack of use of the FOIA by the news media.55
Resolution of the time problem became a challenge to those in Con-
gress who considered delays as symptomatic of agency reluctance to
comply with any public access statute. Congress considered two
types of corrective measures. The first stressed the New Property
goal of formalization and mandated brief time limits to be applied to
all requests." The second type, stressing improved bureaucratic
performance, proposed new structures for encouraging agency per-
sonnel to favor disclosure of information over secrecy. 57 Congress
opted for the first: Ten days were allowed for the first agency re-
sponse to a request in most circumstances and twenty days for de-
ciding an administrative appeal.58 Congress intended that
requesters could use the specific time limit mandates to be effective
them, or where the request requires an extensive search or the collection of substantial
numbers of records).
53. See, e.g., U.S. Gov't Information Policies and Practices-Administration and Operation of
the Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov 't Opera-
tions (pt. 4), 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1219, 1221 (1972) (statement of Roger C. Cramton,
Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings (1972)] ("Complaints continued to abound of foot dragging and unnecessary
red tape on the part of some agencies in making information available that the statute
clearly contemplates should be made available.").
54. See, e.g., House Hearings (1972), supra note 53, at 1279-1337 (statements of W.
Sinclair, Louisville Courier-Journal; R. Straus, Straus Editor's Report; R. McGhee, United States
International; J. Steele, Philadelphia Inquirer; J. Seigenthaler, Nashville Tennessean).
55. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 5, 24 (1974).
56. See, e.g., House Hearings (1972)(pt. 5), supra note 53, at 1376-79 (statement of at-
torney B. Fensterwald calling for two-week initial review of a request).
57. Id. at 1492 (statement M. Rogovin, General Counsel, Common Cause, sug-
gesting that "a spirit of open access can be instilled and maintained through the legisla-
tive and oversight powers of Congress combined with the pressures of public opinion");
The Freedom of Information Act: Hearings on H. R. 5425 and H. R. 4960 Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 29 (1973) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings (1973)] (statement of Rep. J. Erlenborn in support of his proposed bill, H.R.
4960, which created a seven member advisory Freedom of Information Commission:
"Enactment of legislation has little meaning, frequently, if the means does not exist to
enforce it effectively."). The Commission, with its expertise, would investigate an
agency's alleged improper withholding and its finding would be prima facie evidence in
a court proceeding. The bill was never approved but the idea of a FOIA Commission
resurfaced in later hearings in the numerous proposals for a lead agency.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (1982).
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in fights against recalcitrant agencies. The time periods were be-
lieved brief enough to permit the news media and public interest
requesters to meet their deadlines.5 9
The time limit changes created clear, precise rules. The gov-
ernment must answer a request for information within ten working
days 60 except in certain carefully defined situations that justify a ten-
day extension. 61 An administrative appeal must be decided in
twenty days unless one of the narrow criteria for an extension is
satisfied. 62 Formalization is apparent in the requirement that every
requester be treated exactly the same. "Any person" may make a
request under the Act and no power is granted to bureaucrats to
distinguish among requesters based on their individual merit or
59. S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23-28, 42-61 (1974). As originally passed
by the Senate, agencies could expand the time limits in some circumstances to a period
as long as 30 days. At the same time, the bill provided for expedited treatment of re-
quests to serve a public interest. The news media were the only group mentioned in the
legislation as intended recipients of the priority treatment, although agencies were per-
mitted to give priority treatment to non-media requesters as well. S. 2543, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. § 1(c) (1974). In conference both the expandable time limits and the expedited
treatment provisions were dropped and the shorter time limits maintained for all re-
quests and all requesters. S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). No explana-
tion for this change was given in the Conference Report.
60. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (1982) provides: "Each agency, upon any request for
records . . . shall-(1) determine within ten [working] days . . . after the receipt of any
such request whether to comply with such request and shall immediately notify the per-
son making such request of such determination and the reasons therefore .
61. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B) (1982) provides:
In unusual circumstances as specified in this subparagraph, the time limits...
may be extended by written notice . . . . No such notice shall specify a date
that would result in an extension for more than ten working days ....
"[U]nusual circumstances" means, but only to the extent reasonably necessary
to the proper processing of the particular request-
(i) the need to search for and collect the requested records from field
facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office processing
the request;
(ii) the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a volumi-
nous amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single
request; or
(iii) the need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practi-
cable speed, with another agency having substituted interest in the determina-
tion of the request or among two or more components of the agency having
substantial subject-matter interest therein.
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)-(B) (1982). Attorney General W.B. Saxbe interpreted
the ten-day extension of time limits as an aggregate. Extensions could be divided be-
tween the initial and appeal stages of a request, but the total extended time could not
exceed ten working days. Att'y Gen. Memorandum on 1974 Amendments to the Free-
dom of Information Act (Feb. 1975), reprinted in 1 GOV'T DISCLOSURE (P-H) 300,771
(1979).
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need.6" In addition, the time limit provisions illustrate the proletari-
anization intended by Congress for the information access program.
The bureaucrat's role is to process the information request quickly.
No time is allowed for lengthy deliberation about what information
should be released and what should be withheld.6 4 Thejob descrip-
tion is not that of a professional who will treat each request as a
unique event. Instead, the position is to be filled by a clerk who will
apply rigid rules to readily discoverable information. Finally, the
statute establishes a hierarchical system in which the clerk's work is
supervised by courts with de novo review power over every decision
to withhold information.
6 5
A central goal of these time limit reforms was to create a relia-
bly quick public administration system under which public benefit
requesters can realize their entitlement to information access. Have
they worked? No statistically reliable studies are available, but the
ample anecdotal evidence is unequivocally negative.66 While the
63. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982). But see Doyle v.Justice Dep't, 494 F. Supp. 842, 845
(D.D.C. 1980), affd, 668 F.2d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1002 (court
will not adjudicate FOIA claim for one who is fugitive from federal court process).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1982). According to some witnesses at the various
hearings, inadequate deliberation time leads to greater withholding of information. See,
e.g., House Hearings (1973), supra note 57, at 112-13 (statement by Assistant Attorney
Gen. R.G. Dixon, Jr., that "[t]he [amendment favoring strict time limits] is likely to be
counter-productive of the general purpose of maximizing disclosure, by discouraging
the careful and sympathetic processing of requests. The amendment probably would
encourage hasty initial decisions to deny. ... ); House Hearings (1972)(pt. 6), supra note
53, at 2043 (IRS representative's testimony that "[if] a grant would require extensive
effort, a time limit could create a predisposition toward an immediate denial").
Others, however, state that strict time limits could lead to the greater release of
sensitive information because decisions would be too hasty. See, e.g., The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act: Federal Law Enforcement Implementation Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 app. III (1979) (statement from let-
ter by FBI Director Webster submitting proposals to amend the FOIA and stating that if
the FBI did not use its slow, line-by-line examination of each requested document, "clas-
sified data, valid law enforcement interests, and third-party privacy considerations"
would be jeopardized).
It is quite likely that Congress, in imposing the time limits, knew that some inac-
curacy might result. The relationship between the time provided to make a decision and
the quality of the decision is not unique to the FOIA. For example, the Court has held
that Congress deliberately set no time limits for disability determinations under the So-
cial Security Act because of concern that mandatory deadlines would impair the accuracy
and uniformity of the decisions. Heckler v. Day, 104 S. Ct. 2249, 2254-57 (1984).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
66. See generally Freedom of Information Reform Act: Hearings on S. 774 Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 289-90, 516-17,
519 (1983)[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings (1983)] (statements of C. Rowe, editor
and co-publisher, Free Lance-Star, Fredericksburg, Va.; and R. Lewis, national treasurer
and chairman, Freedom of Information Comm., Society of Professional Journalists,
Sigma Delta Chi, and Washington correspondent, Newhouse News Service); 2 Freedom of
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FOIA works for the many private benefit requesters for whom time-
liness is not critical, it fails to work for public benefit requesters for
whom timeliness matters and who continue to experience intolera-
ble delays.
The significance of the need of the media and other public ben-
efit requesters for timely information should not be underestimated.
The major purpose for the FOIA was and is to keep the public in-
formed of the government's activities.6 7 The media and many pub-
lic interest groups fulfill the function in our democracy of collecting
information as the public's surrogate, for the purpose of transmit-
ting the information to the public.6" Yet, they cannot fulfill this
function unless they can gain timely access to government informa-
Information Act: Hearings on S. 587, S. 1235, S. 1247, S. 1730, and S. 1751 Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 308, 479
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings (1981)] (statements of the National Federa-
tion of Press Women, and the Association of American Publishers, Inc.); Oversight of the
Administration of the Federal Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
governmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-
47, 117-46 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings (1980)] (statements of R. Lewis,
representing Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi; K. Low, president and
publisher, Quincy (Mass.) Patriot-Ledger, representing the American Newspaper Publish-
ers Association; and J. Landau, director, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press); Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Senate Hearings (1977)] (statement by L. Schiffer, Center for Law and Social
Policy, outlining the lengthy procedural history of a request for equal employment infor-
mation); Fajans, Media Use of Freedom of Information Act, 1 GOV'T INFORMATION Q. 351,
353, 355 (1984).
The author's many conversations since 1977 with public interest and media re-
questers reconfirm the testimony that delays are so frequent that the FOIA cannot be
relied on to produce timely results.
Beginning with the hearings of the 96th Congress, journalists made a concerted
effort to amend the FOIA to give preference to media and other requesters who sought
information for the public benefit. See, e.g., Senate Hearings (1980), supra, at 51 (testimony
of the FOIA Clearinghouse: "[Tihe overriding purpose of the act was to give the public
access to the Government and to provide for Government accountability. This can best
be done . . . through . . . the widest dissemination of information . . . [through] the
press . . . . [I]n keeping with the overall spirit of the act to ensure that the public is as
informed as possible about the workings of its Government, it makes sense for the press
to have some priority in that regard."); see also id. at 120, 273-74 (similar testimony by
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the Radio Television News Di-
rectors Association).
67. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1966); S. REP. No. 813, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, 10 (1965); 112 CONG. REC. 13,641 (1966) (remarks by Rep. Moss);
110 CONG. REc. 17,087 (1964) (remarks by Sen. Long).
68. The role of the media as surrogate information gatherers, for example, is evident
in access to judicial branch information. The right of access by the public and the media
to trials and related documents and proceedings has been found to be implicit in the
first amendment's "core purpose" of assuring free public discussion. Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
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tion. Thus the media's statutory right of timely access to informa-
tion is tied to the core purpose of the first amendment, facilitating
public discussion, because this right enhances the ability of the me-
dia to transmit information to the public on public issues. 6
9
If the media are so important, why were they not given priority
treatment in the FOIA time limits provisions? New Property think-
ing on formalization suggests the answer: One standard that applies
to all persons is preferable to giving unreliable bureaucrats the dis-
cretion to choose. The argument for formalized information access
rules is especially compelling: They preclude news manipulation by
preventing bureaucrats from favoring one journalist over another.
Congress resolved the tension between the need of the media for
speedy access and the need of the public for assurances of un-
manipulated news by telling agencies to treat all requesters alike,
but to do it quickly. Thus rigid time limits in a formalized system
were intended to solve the media's need for quick access to
information.
Unfortunately, formalization has only made the problem worse,
given a finite level of agency resources.7" When a FOIA office lacks
U.S. 555 (1980); Comment, The First Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials After Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51 U. CM. L. REV. 286 (1984).
69. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966) (citing H. Cross' convic-
tion that "inherent in the right to speak and the right to print is the right to know. The
right to speak and the right to print, without the right to know, are pretty empty
."); 112 CONG. REC. 13,642 (1966) (remarks by Rep. Moss):
Our Constitution recognized this need by guaranteeing free speech and a free
press. Mr. Speaker, those wise men who wrote that document-which was then
and is now a most radical document-could not have intended to give us empty
rights. Inherent in the right of free speech and of free press is the right to
know. It is our solemn responsibility as inheritors of the cause to do all in our
power to strengthen those rights-to give them meaning. Our actions today in
this House will do precisely that.
See also id. at 13,643 (remarks by Rep. King); id. at 13,648 (remarks by Rep. Pucinski);
118 CONG. REC. 9949 (1972) (Special Analysis of Operations of the FOIA, prepared by
the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress); S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-2 (1974).
Beyond this functional argument, there is explicit preference in the FOIA for
public interest groups in the fee waiver and attorneys' fee provisions codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (A)(4)(A), and (A)(4)(E) (1982). According to the statute, fee waivers and attor-
neys' fees may be granted only for the public benefit. Public benefit has been inter-
preted to encompass the functions of the news media in gathering and disseminating
news about the government, as well as the functions of nonprofit public interests groups
in studying and challenging government actions. See Bonine, Public-Interest Fee Waivers
Under the Freedom ofInformation Act, 1981 DUKE L.J. 213, 243-44, 248-49, 249 n.198, 259-
60.
70. An interesting analogy can be made here to the problem of resource allocation in
the welfare area described by Professor Simon. He noted that although the New Prop-
erty theorists recognized welfare and other public benefits as rights, they did not de-
[VOL. 44:38
FOIA-NEw PROPERTY REFORMS
resources to comply with the time limits, attempts will still be made
to treat requesters in an evenhanded manner that looks fair. An of-
fice may decide which of many backlogged requests will be handled
next according to chronological order: The first one received is the
first one answered.7 Other offices use a two-track system to mete
out faster and slower treatment to those requesters who make, re-
velop a distributive principle for such rights. This failure obscured the need to address
the fact that public benefits are paid through income redistribution. When general eco-
nomic resources stopped expanding, the extent of the welfare "right" became limited by
governmental reluctance to increase funding, despite proven need. The right was cur-
tailed to match available funds. Simon, Welfare Rights, supra note 1 at 29-30, 33. Con-
gress has treated the information access program similarly: Requesters have an absolute
right to obtain information, but no credible "distributive principle" has been established
that requires agencies to dedicate resources adequate to do the job.
The theoretical distributive principle for FOIA is one of need: Whatever it takes
to do the job is what agencies should spend. But Congress has never appropriated
funds for FOIA. A House report accompanying the 1974 amendments to the Act ex-
plained that the Act created no need for costly new administrative structures, so no
significant additional funding would be required. The costs of administering the Act
were to "be absorbed within the operating budgets of the agencies." H.R. REP. No. 93-
876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974). The Senate report concurred except that it author-
ized funds to solve highly unusual and temporary problems. S. 2543, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. S 4; S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1974). At the same time, the Senate
report reiterated the expectation of absolute compliance regardless of cost: "This [au-
thorization] language is used advisedly, to assure that no agency can cite a failure to
receive funds which the bill authorizes as an excuse for not complying with the letter of
FOIA in every respect." Id.; see also Bonine, supra note 69, at 250-55.
From the start it has been clear that this theoretical distributive principle was
purely theoretical. The cost to the government of providing access to information has
been much higher than Congress contemplated, and would increase further if agencies
were to comply with the time limits. See generally O'Hanlon, Fee or Free: Public Interest and
the Freedom of Information Act, I GOV'T INFORMATION Q. 366-69 (1985). Despite the reality
that agencies cannot fully perform FOIA functions without cutting into program funds,
Congress has not altered its paradoxical stance. Agency leaders are well aware, how-
ever, that Congress will hold them accountable for programs for which funds are appro-
priated, and will pay little attention to an unfunded FOIA function.
Congress may wish to avoid the budget process for FOIA to avoid making un-
comfortable budgetary compromises. But until it accepts the necessity for funding
FOIA functions separately, no decisions will be made about what are the most valuable
aspects of an information access program, or whether there should be a tradeoff be-
tween program expenditures and information access expenditures. If Congress were to
make such decisions and they were unpopular, pressure could be applied at the budget
hearings to seek change. The theoretical distributive principle, in contrast, allows Con-
gress to claim that every aspect of the information access program is equally valuable.
Unfortunately, this leaves decisionmaking in the agency, with no process to assure that
agency decisions are consistent with the public interest.
71. See, e.g., Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605,
616 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (chronological order upheld as a good faith effort except where
exceptional need or urgency is shown).
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spectively, small and large requests.72 The courts have tended to
uphold these distinctions as "good faith" efforts to comply with the
statute so long as offices apply them consistently. 73 Rarely, how-
ever, have the personal characteristics of the requester-as opposed
to the needs of the government agency-justified "expedited" treat-
ment, that is, processing a request prior to one higher on the rou-
tine agenda. 4
The result of formalization thus has been that public benefit re-
questers wait in line with private benefit requesters. A journalist
writing about an issue of general concern, for example, will be using
the FOIA to add to the public's knowledge about the issue. A busi-
ness seeking information about a competitor will be using the FOIA
for commercial purposes. A prisoner seeking information about the
investigation that led to her conviction will be using the FOIA for a
private purpose. Whether the multitude of competing requests are
lined up chronologically or by size, the result is that requesters pro-
viding a public benefit are not given faster treatment than those
serving a private or commercial purpose. The public's need for in-
formation is not well served by this system. Formalization has com-
bined with the lack of adequate resources to produce a system that
fails to serve the public's needs and subverts the information entitle-
ment system established by the FOIA.
New Property jurisprudes argue that a successful system of pub-
lic administration is bureaucratic and hierarchical; that is, higher of-
ficials and courts will make street-level personnel abide by the rules.
The FOIA reflects this thinking; courts were to enforce the time lim-
its when agencies did not comply. Like formalization, bureaucra-
tization has failed. Three reasons seem to explain this
phenomenon. First, the courts will not order the immediate release
of the requested information when an agency delays, because the
documents may contain exempt material. Concern for interests
protected by the exemptions, such as national security and personal
privacy, outweighs the incentive to ensure expeditious access to in-
72. For example, the FBI uses this system, labeling requests as "project" (difficult)
or "non-project" (simple). Id. at 612.
73. Id. at 616.
74. The only noteworthy exception is the request of Eldridge Cleaver, whose request
was expedited because he persuaded courts that delay might cost him life or liberty.
Cleaver v. Kelley, 427 F. Supp. 80, 81-82 (D.D.C. 1976) (court concluded that Cleaver
was confronted with an exceptional need for the information requested from the FBI,
since the records might prove exculpatory in a state criminal trial, and found that the
public had a great interest in a complete adjudication of criminal matters).
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formation.75 Second, to my knowledge courts have not ordered re-
calcitrant agencies to allocate more resources to the FOIA office.
While consistent with the New Property theory of judicial supervi-
sion of the bureaucracy, such an order may be beyond judicial
power76 unless it is limited to the schedule of a particular case.77
Third, the time limits are so short that they must be self-actuating;
on a case-by-case basis courts have no practical enforcement means.
Even the thirty-day period that elapses before a defendant agency is
required to answer the complaint doubles the time permitted under
the statute.78 Recognizing this, courts have declined sub silentio to
supervise agency compliance; instead, they typically defer to the
agency's timetable.79 In unusual cases, the agency's timetable has
been shortened, but only to periods three and four times longer
75. Alternatively, a court may order the release of nonexempt materials upon its own
de novo review. See Giannella, supra note 31, at 251. Without benefit of the agency's
knowledge about the requested documents, however, a court ordinarily will not be capa-
ble of distinguishing between the exempt and the nonexempt. What appears to be a
nonexempt factual account of a meeting, for example, may be exempt in some circum-
stances as attorney work-product, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982), in other circumstances as
a central document in an open criminal investigation, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982), and
in still others as purely private information about a person other than the requester, 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982). By the time the agency advised the court of the background
information, either by testimony or, more typically, by an index, the time limits would
have expired. See generally Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 977 (1974).
76. Cf. Kissinger v. Reporters Comm., 445 U.S. 136, 150-51(1980) (judicial authority
to devise remedies can only be invoked if agency has improperly withheld agency
records); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292-93 (1979) (FOIA does not author-
ize courts to bar disclosure of agency records); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.
132, 161-62 (1975)(district court erroneously required agency to create explanatory ma-
terial for disclosure); Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft, 421 U.S. 168, 191 (1975)
(order of court of appeals requiring disclosure of certain documents rested on errone-
ous assumption that the FOIA can be used to require administrative board to write an
opinion).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(C) (1982); see, e.g., Hamlin v. Kelley, 433 F. Supp. 180, 183
(N.D. Ill. 1977) (FBI ordered to produce not less than approximately 20 percent of re-
quested materials at thirty-day intervals); Cleaver v. Kelley, 427 F. Supp. 80, 82 (D.D.C.
1976) (court set dates for production of index specifying documents for which exemp-
tions were claimed and for production of nonexempt documents); Hayden v. United
States Dep't ofJustice, 413 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (D.D.C. 1976) (court established sched-
ule for release of documents held by FBI).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(C) (1982). Prior to the 1974 amendments, the government
was allowed the normal 60 days to answer a FOIA complaint. The 1974 amendments
reduced the time to 30 days.
79. The controlling standard for judicial review allows agencies to take into account
the volume of requests. In Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547
F.2d 605 (1976), the District of Columbia Circuit held that an agency would not be
required to meet the statutory time limits when the agency faced a "volume of requests
• . . vastly in excess of that anticipated by Congress [and] when existing resources are
inadequate .... ." Id. at 616. The court articulated the standard: An agency is re-
1985]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
than the statutory maximum.8" In no instance has a court ordered
an agency to respond to a request within the statutory period."
Guided by New Property jurisprudence, Congress attempted to
ensure timely access to government information through a formal-
ized, bureaucratized and proletarianized system of time limits for
answering requests for information. That system has failed. Inade-
quate agency resources mean that relatively few FOIA requests are
answered within the statutory period. Congress has never con-
fronted this problem by ordering agencies to provide more re-
sources, and it is not likely to do so in a time of budget cutting.
Agency personnel may not routinely give speedier treatment to the
media and public interest requesters without violating the FOIA's
mandate of equal treatment for all. Requesters who provide a pub-
lic benefit, therefore, stand in line with everyone else. Despite their
supervisory role, courts do not enforce the time limits. In sum, the
statutory time limit reforms have not only failed to live up to their
promise, they have meant that the public benefit groups that should
have benefitted from the time limits instead have been harmed.
The last three Congresses have examined the interdependent
problems of delay and agency attitudes. 2 Just as in 1974, journal-
ists testified before committees of each Congress that slow replies
quired to make a "good faith effort" to comply with the Act and to exercise "due dili-
gence." Id.
80. See, e.g., Hayden, 413 F. Supp. at 1289 (three months); Hamlin, 433 F. Supp. at 183
(four months).
81. For example, in one early case the trial court accepted the plaintiffs', public inter-
est requesters, argument that they had an absolute right under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)
(1982) to have their request processed within the statutory period. Accordingly, without
any hearing or findings of fact, the district court ordered the release of the documents
within thirty days-ten days for the initial review and twenty days for the appeal. Open
America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
The order was vacated by the Court of Appeals, which found "exceptional circum-
stances" existed justifying the agency's delay. Id. at 616. Judicial acceptance of lengthy
delays is also shown in decisions on attorneys' fee petitions. Courts typically disfavor fee
petitions if the requester failed to engage in lengthy negotiations with an agency prior to
filing suit for release of information. Compare Lacy v. United States Dep't ofJustice, CA
M-83-2727 (D.Md. June 14, 1984) with Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, No.
82-1229 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 5, 1984); Cox v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 601 F.2d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 1979). Denying attorney's fees to media requesters because their deadlines pre-
clude long negotiations impairs their ability to obtain counsel.
82. See, e.g., S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S2688-94 (1983); S. 1751,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S11,702-13 (1981); S. 587, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
127 CONG. REC. S1628-31 (1981); Senate Hearings (1983), supra note 66; Senate Hearings
(1981), supra note 66, (Vols. 1 & 2); FOIA Oversight Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as House




defeated them, regardless of what information ultimately was re-
leased."3  Agencies replied-as they had in 1974-that short time
limits could not be met. 84 Congress considered proposals to make
the time limits more flexible, such as enlarging the time allowed to
process a request encompassing a large number of pages and con-
tracting the time allowed when the requester demonstrates an ur-
gent need for the information.85 No bill has been enacted as yet,
although one has passed the Senate.86
These proposals of the 1980s echo those of the 1970s. To
solve the continuing problem of agency unwillingness to meet the
needs for public access to government information, the FOIA re-
formers tinker with a statutory scheme of standardized time periods
to give agencies more time. Unless more resources are dedicated to
the effort, modifying the time limits will increase the average legal
response time to conform with the actual average time; actual aver-
age times will not decrease. The solutions may decrease bureau-
cratic anxiety about lawbreaking, but they will not solve the problem
of delays in answering public benefit requests for information.
83. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g, Senate Hearings (1983), supra note 66, at 29 (testimony by Asst. Att'y Gen.
Rose that "[tihe FOIA's unrealistic time limits have also caused serious problems for the
Government and FOIA requesters alike . . [because] [t]he short 10-day time limit...
often forces agencies to respond prematuredly or hurriedly"); Senate Hearings (1980),
supra note 66, at 19 (testimony ofJ. Shenefield, Dep't ofJustice that "[t]he current ten-
day limit has caused the government great difficulty since the likelihood for mistakes
. . . is great and public confidence is undercut when the government fails, regardless of
good faith effort, to meet the limit"); id. at 434 (statement of FBI director, W.H. Web-
ster, that "[t]he volume and nature of work involved and, to an extent the limited re-
sources available, render it impossible for the FBI to meet the 10-day time limit").
85. See, e.g., Senate Hearings (1980), supra note 66, at 437-39 (FBI proposal calling for
establishing "a relationship between the amount of work required to respond to a re-
quest and the amount of time permitted to do the work"); id. at 26 (Dep't of Justice
proposal that the "time limit [be] tied to the work load required. Obviously, requests
requiring a massive search should be permitted more time than those requiring cursory
review.").
86. S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S1794-1822 (1984). The bill calls
for the standard 10-day time limit for initial review, 20 days for appeal to be used for
uncomplicated requests. Id. § 3(6)(A)(i)-(ii). In "unusual circumstances" (records held
in separate locations, voluminous records requested, need for consultation with another
agency, meeting deadline would impair "statutory agency functions," need to notify
submitter of information, or unusual and substantial backlog at agency) an agency may
extend the standard time limits up to thirty working days. Id. § 3(6)(B). The bill retains
the "exceptional circumstances" provision of the FOIA, id. § 3(6)(C), and adds an "ex-
pedited access" provision for those demonstrating "compelling need," id. § 3(6)(E). S.
REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1983) interprets the compelling need provision
of S. 774 as giving expedited access to those "who can demonstrate a genuine need and




III. A SPECULATIVE PROPOSAL
If Professor Simon's criticisms of the New Property reforms of
the 1960s and 1970s concerning welfare administration are valid,
current FOIA reforms are on the wrong track. What is the alterna-
tive? I think it may be time to consider applying the principles of
social work jurisprudence, which granted street-level bureaucrats
the discretion to address at least some of the needs of individual
recipients.8 7 To do something similar with information access
would mean, first, amending the FOIA to eliminate rigid time peri-
ods governing every requester and every request, and to permit bu-
reaucrats to give priority to certain requesters.88 The needs of
media and public interest requesters would be met speedily; other
requesters would have to wait until resources were available to ac-
commodate their requests. The statute would thus allow the admin-
istration of the FOIA to effectuate, not impede, the public's right to
know.
Second, to follow further on the path of social work jurispru-
dence, one would have to ask what kind of bureaucrats would be
empowered to make choices among requesters. Professor Simon
suggests that, in social work jurisprudence, the role of the street-
level bureaucrat is that of a professional who is socialized, educated,
accountable, and who occupys a position of high status and reward.
Professional qualities are necessary, the social work jurisprudes rea-
soned, because the bureaucrats would be empowered to respond
flexibly to individual claims of welfare entitlements by looking to the
purposes of the welfare system.8 9
The analogous occupation in the information access field is the
public information specialist. This is a title held by many of those
who now perform street-level FOIA functions. Although many of
the specialists demonstrate a personal commitment to the ideal of
public access to information, the prevailing norm within govern-
ment is, in my experience, the opposite; to most civil servants, pub-
lic information is considered contrary to the proper functioning of
87. Simon, Welfare Rights, supra note 1, at 35.
88. Ascertaining which requesters qualify for preferential treatment should not
prove difficult. Media and other public benefit requesters can be identified according to
the same criteria applicable under the public benefit criteria of the fee waiver and attor-
neys' fees provisions. See supra note 69. Agencies can articulate their specific criteria in
detail by adopting rules pursuant to the usual notice and comment procedures of the
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
89. Simon, Welfare System, supra note 1, at 1243.
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government. Today's public information specialist, therefore, usu-
ally works in an environment hostile to his or her professional goals.
As the social work jurisprudes stressed, a discretionary system
depends on people who have a strong and continuing commitment
to the goals of the program. The public information specialist, in
the system I am proposing, would be developed through a profes-
sionalizing system of recruitment, education, and support.90 Re-
cruitment efforts should focus, in my opinion, on journalists, whose
training, experience, and personal inclination often produce a
strong commitment to informing the public. Their commitment
should be enhanced through continuing education and supportive
supervision. To reinforce their professional status and their com-
mitment to public information goals, frequent contact with
nongovernment journalists and other public benefit requesters
should be maintained. Once professionalized, public interest spe-
cialists, like social workers, could be trusted with the discretion to
distinguish among requesters on public benefit grounds.
We can look to one piece of FOIA history for evidence that
street-level personnel can exercise discretion to the public's benefit
in implementing the FOIA: the history of fee waivers. Under the
FOIA, waivers from the usual search and copying fees are granted
whenever the release of the requested information will "primarily
benefit the general public."'" Until 1981, whatever policies existed
on assessing fees and granting fee waivers were established by each
agency. 92 Agencies were criticized for the lack of uniformity, 93 but
90, The value of upgrading the training, status, and responsibilities of the public
information officers with FOIA duties was discussed at length by the House Committee
in 1972, but no legislation developed. Administration of the Freedom of Information
Act, H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 49-50 (1972).
91. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1982) provides:
In order to carry out the provisions of this section, each agency shall promul-
gate regulations . . . specifying a uniform schedule of fees . . . . Such fees
shall be limited to reasonable standard charges for document search and dupli-
cation and provide for recovery of only the direct costs of such search and du-
plication. Documents shall be finished without charge or at a reduced charge
where the agency determines that waiver or reduction of the fee is in the public
interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily ben-
efiting the general public.
92. Bonine, supra note 69, at 227. Early in 1981 the Department of Justice issued a
memorandum on fees and fee waivers. This attempt at creating a uniform policy was
ineffective because the guidance was extremely complex. Att'y Gen. Memorandum on
Freedom of Information Act Fee Waivers (Jan. 5, 1981); Office of Information Law and
Policy Memorandum, Interim Fee Waiver Policy (Dec. 18, 1980), both reprinted in I Gov'T
DISCLOSURE (P-H) 300,793 (Feb. 10, 1981).
93. Bonine, supra note 69, at 216-17.
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despite the relative anarchy, two things seemed clear to this ob-
server: (1) many-probably most-media and public interest re-
questers did not pay many fees, and (2) decisions not to charge fees
and to waive fees were being made at a low level, often in the public
information office.
In 1983, under the Reagan Administration, the Justice Depart-
ment lawyers promulgated guidelines on fees9 4 under which far
fewer media and public interest requesters can qualify for fee waiv-
ers.95 Further, the guidelines authorize agencies to require the pay-
ment of a fee or deposit before documents are processed to
determine exemption claims. These guidelines have been criticized
because they are used to discourage requests by the media for infor-
mation on subjects of public importance. 96
While I cannot prove this with absolute certainty, it appears
that, prior to the implementation of these guidelines, fee waiver de-
cisions usually were made by street-level bureaucrats and public
benefit requesters gained access to more records at lower cost and
with less litigation. This served the public by allowing the public's
information gathering surrogate more access to information.
In contrast, now that lawyers have created guidelines that cur-
94. Att'y Gen. Memorandum on Office of Legal Policy Fee Waiver Policy Guidance,
(Jan. 7, 1983), reprinted in 1 Gov'T DISCLOSURE (P-H) 300,815 (Feb. 8, 1983).
95. "[A]IIl agency personnel should be aware of the dual policy objectives embodied
in the statutory fee waiver provisions: (1) the fostering of disclosure of nonexempt
agency records where it will primarily benefit the general public, and (2) the preserva-
tion of public funds where there will be insufficient public benefit derived from disclo-
sure." Id. The additional requirement that agencies weigh fiscal concerns in
determining whether to grant fee waivers diminishes the chances that public requesters
will qualify for fee waivers. Further, the requirement may be beyond agency authority.
See Bonine, supra note 69, at 250-55 ("[T]he FOIA does not permit agencies to make
cost to the government a criterion by which fee-waiver or fee-reduction decisions may be
made.") The second factor outlined in the 1983 guidelines places an emphasis on what
documents will eventually be disclosed and their relative value to the public. As a result,
agencies are advised to examine the requested documents before determining whether a
fee waiver meets the criterion. Many agencies are reluctant to process documents with-
out a firm commitment to pay the fees and, in many cases, a deposit.
96. "High costs associated with obtaining government documents ... presented se-
rious obstacles to many potential users, including the news media, scholars, researchers,
and nonprofit organizations." Agency Fee Waiver Policies Under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, A Common Cause Study 1 (1984) (on file with the iaryland Law Review). A
restrictive fee waiver policy "could result in limited public access to information of con-
cern to the general public .... ." Id. at 5. "Restrictive policies could . . .seriously
affect the public's access to government documents. The reported changes in fee waiver
policy occurring in response to the Justice Department's January 1983 guidelines at sev-
eral agencies suggest that serious obstacles to obtaining information may well have been
imposed." Id. at 6-7. See Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1983,
1984 DUKE L.J. 377, 391-93.
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tail the use of fee waivers, information flow to the public is impeded.
Prior to this lawyerly intervention, street-level bureaucrats could,
and in my observation did, emphasize the public's right to informa-
tion over particular agency interests.9 7 Under the lawyers, the bal-
ance has shifted towards non-disclosure.
The fee waiver experience suggests that discretion can be used
effectively when it is entrusted to the right civil servants. The public
administration system I am proposing to assure timely responses to
public benefit requesters blends the successful characteristics of the
fee waiver experience with characteristics of social work jurispru-
dence. Properly recruited, trained, and supervised street-level bu-
reaucrats are given discretion to distinguish among requesters and
allocate resources to those who could benefit the public. They are
not held to inflexible timetables; instead, their discretion is guided
by the standard that public benefit requesters should not have to
wait for information. Lawyers and other non-relevant professionals
have no substantive role in the decision-making process.
Under my proposal, the judicial role also changes. Courts
would be relieved of routine supervision of time limits compliance.
Instead, they would defer to the professional judgment of the public
information specialist unless her action was arbitrary or capricious.
It would be arbitrary, for example, for a public information special-
ist to make a public benefit requester wait for service while a private
benefit requester was served. Similarly, a reasonable public infor-
mation specialist would not assign a public benefit request to a staff
97. A similarly suggestive example was uncovered by Professor Tomlinson in his re-
search on the interrelationship between the FOIA and discovery. He found that public
information officers were more inclined to release documents than the government's
litigating attorneys wanted them to be. He discovered by interviewing attorneys and
public information officers that:
Inadvertent or careless FOIA releases of exempt records are a rarity. More
frequently, the public information officer's release decision is, in the words of
government litigators, "mistaken." It is perhaps more accurate to say that the
officer's perspective on claiming an exemption is different than that of a litigat-
ing attorney. This difference is particularly apparent with respect to the delib-
erative process component of exemption b(5). The public information officer's
job is to release as much information as possible, while the attorney's job is to
defend the government's position in litigation. The attorney is particularly sen-
sitive about releasing internal documents critical of the agency's present posi-
tion or advocating a contrary position; public information officers and lower
level program people are likely to be less sensitive. In addition, deliberative
process and work-product claims have special cogency when raised in litigation
and lose much of their force when considered in the abstract in response to a
FOIA request.
Tomlinson, Use of the Freedom of Information Act for Discovery Purposes, 43 MD. L. REV. 119,
167 (1984) (footnote omitted).
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member whose work schedule precluded a speedy response. The
more difficult problems would continue to be resources. Courts
would be expected, under my proposal, to evaluate whether a public
information specialist has dedicated all available agency resources
to satisfy public benefit requesters. Because FOIA functions are not
separately funded, deciding what agency resources are "available"
can be a difficult factual question.98 If an agency can show that all
available resources are being dedicated to public benefit requesters,
but public benefit requesters still consistently experience long de-
lays, a court under my proposal would order that more resources be
allocated. Without this authority, courts would continue to be un-
able to insist that agencies satisfy the FOIA's fundamental public
information objectives.
How would my proposed reform avoid the pitfalls of its prede-
cessor, section 3 of the Public Information Section of the APA?
First, my proposal does not restore section 3's authority to deny in-
formation to a member of the public by determining that she is not a
"proper person" to see information, or to withhold information for
"good cause." Second, in contrast to section 3, here agency discre-
tion to delay answering a request would not be unlimited. If the
request is from a public benefit requester, immediate action would
be the norm. The only exception would be when an agency is ex-
periencing a temporary shortage of resources. Private benefit re-
questers should be delayed only to benefit public benefit requesters;
an agency would have no discretion to permit additional delays.
Third, section 3 had no provision for judicial review. The re-
view I propose, while limited, should be effective in motivating re-
luctant agencies. Finally, requests under section 3 could be
answered by any agency employee. I propose, instead, to rely on
public information specialists whose professional motivation will di-
rect them to help requesters achieve effective access to government
records.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our democracy relies on the existence of a citizenry well-in-
formed about the government's policy choices and administration.
The FOIA was designed to foster public education, especially
through the work of information gathering surrogates, such as the
news media. The permanent shortage of resources dedicated to the
FOIA, however, has crippled it for the purposes of the groups it was
98. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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intended to serve. Revising the statutory scheme without recogniz-
ing and confronting the interactive problems of resource shortages
and the needs of public benefit requesters will not produce the best
solution. Extending time limits for everyone is a poor solution be-
cause the media must report on fresh news. Demanding increases in
resources is, quite simply, futile. On the other hand, both problems
are addressed by a proposal to create a zone of discretion within
which professionalized public information specialists are instructed
to prefer public benefit requesters over private and commercial re-
questers. No more resources normally would be needed,9 9 but
more public benefit requesters could get what they need when they
need it.
Under the present system, expecting consistent compliance
with the time limits is futile. While a few agencies meet them most
of the time, most agencies will not or cannot. In response, public
benefit requesters either resign themselves to intolerable waiting
periods or refuse to use the FOIA. Professor Simon's reconsidera-
tion of New Property and social work jurisprudence suggests that
the continued failure of the FOIA as a public information vehicle
may be avoidable. His critique convinces me that the failure of the
time limit reforms is attributable in large measure to their formal-
ized, bureaucratized, and proletarianized system of administration.
I am also convinced that changing the roles of the street-level bu-
reaucrats and the courts, consistent in large measure with social
work jurisprudence, would increase the FOIA's contribution to pub-
lic life.
Applying social work jurisprudence to the time limit reforms
does not suggest to me that a discretionary system is appropriate for
every aspect of an information access system. For example, I do not
think that social work jurisprudence would justify eliminating the
public's entitlement to certain types of information, nor do I read
Professor Simon's critique as suggesting such a result. The insights
of social work jurisprudence can, however, be applied to the public
administration concepts of the FOIA, in order to allow its substan-
tive entitlement to be more completely realized.
The last several decades have been rich in attempts to solve
problems through new systems of public action and administration.
The strengths of some approaches and the weaknesses of others
now can be examined and assessed. Professor Simon has exhumed
99. But see Simon, Welfare System, supra note 1, at 1257 (professionalism may require
too many resources to educate the bureaucrats and restructure the work setting).
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social work jurisprudence in an attempt to demonstrate that (New
Property assumptions about public benefits may be problematic.
His critique is valuable in the field of information access as well.
More research is needed before we can evaluate the different ap-
proaches suggested by his critique. Professor Simon's heresies will,
I hope, inspire that research.
